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Mr. Raymond L. Garthoff
Office of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Ray:

In the absence of Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCone, both of whom are out of the city on a brief trip, I would like to acknowledge and thank you very much for your letters of 3 November and for the enclosed copies of your most interesting lecture at the National War College on "Soviet Military Strategy."

When Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCone return I will promptly bring this to their attention.

Executive Officer

ILLEGIB

STAT O/DCI/[redacted]rap(7 Nov 61)
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addr
1 - JSE
1 - AAB hold file w/basic and encl for Mr. Dulles
1 - Jerry hold file w/basic and encl for Mr. McCone
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ADDRESS OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

G/PM

In reply refer to
G/PM

November 3, 1961

SECRET

PERSONAL

Mr. John A. McCone
Director-Designate of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

Let me take this opportunity belatedly to congratulate you on becoming Director of Central Intelligence, and to welcome you back to Washington. As you may know, not long ago I transferred to a senior position in the newly constituted Office of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State.

While I realize you are very busy preparing to take on your new responsibilities, I am taking the liberty of enclosing a copy of a lecture on "Soviet Military Strategy" which I am giving at the National War College. Mr. Dulles had expressed an interest in it, and I am sending him a copy; I thought you, too, might find it of interest.

I wish you all success in your challenging new position, and I hope we will have a chance to get together for a chat sometime soon.

Vera joins me in sending our warmest regards to you, and to Mrs. McCone.

Sincerely,

Ray Garthoff

Raymond L. Garthoff
Office of Politico-Military Affairs

Enclosure
(1) Copy of lecture on
"Soviet Military Strategy"

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National War College Lecture
Raymond L. Garthoff
November 7, 1961

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

The Soviet leaders do not believe that deliberate initiation of general war would be in their interest in the foreseeable future. They also seek to avoid serious risk of general war, and will continue to pursue a policy of "peaceful" but active expansion of their influence and power. Within this general policy they are alert to exploit counter-deterrence (that is, the neutralization of our strategic deterrent for certain local challenges) when they consider the risks to be low, especially in cases where aggression can be indirect. They seek to capitalize on their growing military power, and in situations of military demonstrations such as we have seen in recent months, the Soviets are adept and aggressive in their stance. Moreover, they will continue to employ violence when they deem it expedient, though probably not by initiating overt limited wars. Rather, they exploit situations where indirect aggression can be masked to lull those in the world who are prone to overlook all but the most blatant Communist aggression. They will seek to intimidate those whom they cannot cajole. But they do not seek war.

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The communist ideology and purely power-political considerations both place the criterion of calculated risk, cost, and gain at the foundation of any strategic initiative. Communist doctrine certainly does inject unusually strong hostility and suspicion into Soviet policymaking, and expansionist aims into Soviet policy, but Marxism-Leninism does not propel the Soviet Union toward the embrace of war or the witting assumption of great risks. Why should the Soviet leaders, confident in their minds that they are moving with the sweep of History, court disaster by a premature gamble?

Thus, the fundamental operative objective, underlying and guiding Soviet political and military strategy, is: to advance the power of the USSR in whatever ways are most expedient so long as the survival of the Soviet power itself is not endangered.

Mutual deterrence has resulted from the acquisition of global nuclear striking power by the United States and now by the Soviet Union, despite our continuing superiority in strategic striking power. Mutual deterrence has been

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described as a "delicate balance of terror." But while this balance is by no means inevitably and eternally enduring, it is not fragile. The risks and consequences of a global thermonuclear holocaust are recognized by the Soviet leaders who strive to avoid any "adventurist" gamble. The importance in Soviet policy of the over-all balance of power, the "relation of forces in the world arena" as they call it, militates against a preoccupation with purely military solutions. The Soviet leaders are not poised to unleash their -- and our -- military power as soon as a theoretical probability of military victory crosses some calibrated balance of 50% or 70% or indeed even 90%. In the Communist view, History can not be made hostage to the mathematical computations of some "communivac."

Thus nuclear war seems ever less likely as a rational instrumentality chosen to advance the position of the Soviet Union. Of course, an irrational decision is never inconceivable. But more dangerous, because more probable, is the possibility of "war by miscalculation." There are a number of possible ways in which an unintended general nuclear war could occur.

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Probably the most important one, often noted, is the possibility that local hostilities ("conventional" or, all the more, nuclear) might be expanded in a vortex of actions and reactions into a general nuclear war. Both sides could be drawn into a maelstrom of miscalculation. Another way in which miscalculation could arise would be if one side incorrectly believed the other to be about to launch a surprise attack, and therefore decided to launch a pre-emptive blow, in a desperate last-minute attempt to seize the initiative and get in the first strike.

The Berlin crisis is a good example, perhaps it will become the classic one, of the kind of political escalation which could pose miscalculation at such a peak of tension as to lead to war. The Soviets do not want war, and they do not want to press us to the very precipice. But they do want to pick up all they can squeeze in political concessions before relaxing tension. We speak of persuading them that we would go to war "over Berlin." They've always known that, or at least feared the possibility enough not to provoke it.

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For this reason they don't press demands at a level which we could readily define as a casus belli. Their maximum stated demand is a non-communist "free city" of West Berlin. The critical issue is, from the Soviet standpoint, how far can they go while still controlling the risks of war. From our point of view, the same critical question is, what can we do to prevent them from gaining the things we are not ready to go to war over. Our problem is not just to make our deterrent credible, it is in fact to have a credible deterrent to the kind of gradual and indirect challenges which the Soviets are posing. Each side has a powerful desire to avoid war, but each must temper this to some extent by estimating how it can still pursue its other objectives. And any calculation of risks, almost by definition, includes the possibility of miscalculation.

The danger of war is not so much that the Soviets will judge the time is ripe to strike us, as that they may misjudge the time as ripe to push us.

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In the Soviet view, the main arena of conflict is the political one. We tend to differentiate between the political, economic, military, and psychological factors in national power and in national strategy. The Soviets on the other hand consider that while such factors as economic or military power have particular characteristics as instruments, they are all subordinate to political strategy. Military power is thus by preference used to exert political influence. The flexibility in determining concrete Soviet objectives, depending upon concrete opportunities and constraints, evokes flexibility in their strategic thinking, doctrine, plans, and action. It extends to flexibility in selection of political or military means, and in selection among military means if such are to be employed at all. There is no deadline for the final triumph of communism in the world, and no predetermined role for military power in pursuing that goal.

"The objective of military strategy," we read in a secret Soviet General Staff organ, "is the creation by military means of those conditions under which politics is

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in a position to achieve the aims it sets for itself." As we have noted, under contemporary circumstances the Soviets do not see general war as a suitable instrument of policy. But before examining other applications of military power, let us review the military strategic concept for waging general war should it occur.

The Soviet military strategic concept, in the thermonuclear era much as before, continues to rest on the belief that the primary objective of military operations is the destruction of hostile military forces. Economic, administrative, and population resources of the enemy, as the Soviets even admit, would also be subjected to attack. But the fundamental strategic concept remains the decisive destruction of opposing military forces and the seizure by occupation of the enemy's territories. Thus, the priority Soviet objectives are: (1) the enemy's strategic nuclear delivery capabilities and (2) the enemy's capability to hold land -- an application to the current state of weaponry of the traditional concept of neutralizing the enemy's military power, rather than his military potential.

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In keeping with this strategic concept, Soviet military doctrine holds necessary the co-ordinated use of any form of military power, as expedient. This presupposes a military establishment which allows flexibility in selecting military means. It is reflected in Soviet belief in the need for balanced and varied military capabilities. Under the impact of nuclear and other modern weapons, the application of this doctrine has been extended from the idea simply of a combined force operating in a theater battlefield, though this too remains, to comprise co-ordinated operations on a global scale. As Marshal Malinovsky declared just two weeks ago (October 23, 1961) to the Twenty-Second Party Congress in Moscow: "Despite the fact that in a future war a decisive role will be played by nuclear missile weapons, we nonetheless come to the conclusion that final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as the result of combined operations of all arms of the armed forces."

Complementing the reaffirmation of combined and balanced forces, Soviet military doctrine rejects reliance on any single weapon system -- including the ICBM with multi-megaton

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warhead. This principle is deeply ingrained in the Communist precept to avoid "gambling" on any single or superficially "easy" means to victory; such over-reliance on any weapon is condemned as "adventuristic." Moreover, in evaluating the forces needed to implement their strategic concept, the Soviet military leaders see requirements to neutralize enemy missiles and bombers thousands of miles away, and at the same time to overcome infantrymen and tanks in all the vast reaches of Eurasia beyond the borders of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. To meet these requirements, they do not consider that nuclear striking capabilities suffice. Victory, in their view, requires defeating the enemy's military forces in order to seize and occupy vast areas of land -- and in the last analysis only a ground force can do this. As Marshal Malinovsky has noted: "Missiles and nuclear weapons are powerful military means, but they cannot conquer the territory of another state." Indeed, Soviet generals have argued that in a nuclear war even larger and more powerful ground forces may be required than in a conventional one. For one thing, the nuclear destruction of large numbers of troops will

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require large reserves. For another, the Soviets may believe that industrial, economic and manpower resources of other countries seized by advance on land would compensate in part for the extensive nuclear damage to the Soviet economic system. Moreover, such action insures an end to enemy recuperation and resistance in the area seized, and -- to put it mildly -- would have great morale effects everywhere.

Now I do not want to dwell on details of Soviet military doctrine and theory, but it is important to realize that over recent years they have reviewed and modified their doctrine, without revising its fundamental assumption of the likelihood of a long and arduous war in which large armies are required. Again to cite Malinovsky's recent speech: "We consider that under contemporary conditions a future world war will, despite enormous losses, require mass armed forces multimillion strong." Consistent with their image of a long war, the Soviets describe the basic military, economic and morale potentials as "the decisive factors in determining the outcome of war." An authoritative Ministry of Defense publication has stated: "In the strategic planning of war the correct employment of

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the troops must be estimated not only for its initial period but for its whole course." And in a rare specification of a Soviet strategic planning requirement, one Soviet general declared a few years ago that: "strategy must establish the requirements of the armed forces for the first year of military operations." Subsequent requirements, he added, would be determined during the course of the war. The Soviet conception has been modified somewhat in recent years, but it is still the official view that while the duration of a war cannot be fully predicted, it is likely to be very long.

The Soviet leaders have -- for ideological and morale reasons -- been averse to explicit admissions that general nuclear war would be cataclysmic for all concerned, but they have been increasingly frank in disclosing the level of devastation that would occur. Marshal Malinovsky admitted in his recent Party Congress speech: "A future world war, if it is not averted, will have an unprecedentedly destructive character. It will lead to the deaths of hundreds of millions of people, and whole countries will be turned into lifeless desert covered with ash."

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The Soviets, nonetheless, do not ascribe to the view that mutual devastation spells mutual defeat. Soviet mobilization and dispatch of ground forces would, in their view, be less critically disrupted than would ours by the initial and continuing nuclear exchange, due to their larger force-in-being and to its deployment. The mutual destruction of strategic air and missile bases and cities would presumably consume the major part of the respective long-range bomber and missile forces, and the Soviets evidently calculate that the continued efforts of these forces would, in a strategic sense, cancel each other out. Remaining Soviet armies are viewed as still able to defeat proportionately weakened enemy forces on the ground. Thus the Soviets hope they could go on to win by occupying the Eurasian continent and shrinking the Free World to a devastated North Atlantis. The Soviets visualize the role of the combined ground and supporting air and missile team not as a subsequent "mopping-up" stage, but as a significant element in determining the final outcome of the war. Airborne and armored forces are considered especially suitable for the nuclear battlefield, and have been stressed in Soviet doctrine and practice.

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Thus, in the long run, the basic economic and military potential of the Soviet Bloc, especially that mobilized before hostilities, is expected to "win." This assuredly does not mean that the Soviets are so certain of success, and so indifferent to costs and risks, that they would launch a general war in the foreseeable future. But the image I have drawn is that now held by the Soviets as the prospective course of a general nuclear war if one should occur.

One of the important revisions of Soviet military doctrine, about five years ago, was a recognition of the greatly increased importance of surprise in modern war with supersonic aircraft, long-range ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the Soviets hold that surprise can be neutralized by a vigilant and prepared major power so that it will not determine the outcome of a war, and is therefore not a reliable or sufficient basis to yield a blitzkrieg victory in general war.

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There was, however, a noteworthy innovation into Soviet strategy associated with the increased importance accorded to surprise. At the beginning of 1955, the Soviets concluded that mere repulse of an attempted surprise attack upon the Soviet Union might be insufficient, and that if an enemy were clearly launching an attack on the Soviet Union, a preemptive strike should be made. As there has been some confusion on this point, let me make clear that the Soviets explicitly distinguished this preemptive strike from preventive war -- it was to be undertaken only if the enemy should himself attempt to make a surprise attack, and would represent a desperate last-minute effort to blunt the enemy's attempt and seize the initiative.

There is little question that if the Soviet leaders ever were absolutely certain that the US was about to attack them, and that there was no alternative to war, they would themselves strike preemptively. However, such certainty on the part of any country about the intentions of another is extremely unlikely, particularly as the role of missiles

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increases. The Soviet leaders have probably concluded that it will be impossible to count upon incontrovertible advance evidence that an enemy is irrevocably committed to imminent attack. Moreover, compulsion to strike first at a time when the threat of hostile attack is still ambiguous declines as missile systems become more important and less vulnerable and the margin of relative advantage to be derived from a first strike decreases.

Soviet military thinking, so far as we have been able to ascertain from all available evidence, has regarded preemption and retaliation solely as contingent means of response in a situation which would not be a time of Soviet choosing or the result of a deliberate planned buildup for optimum Soviet position for war, but rather would represent some time when the Soviets believed they must act with whatever resources were available. There is no indication that the Soviets have ever regarded theoretical calculations of force levels based on these contingencies as the criterion to be followed in establishing their long-range striking

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forces. Indeed, the composition of the long-range attack forces to date has not seemed to be designed to meet the contingencies of deliberate or preemptive Soviet initiation, or still less of retaliation after an enemy first strike. Preemption would not represent, or reflect Soviet conviction that, requirements for the neutralization of the Western striking forces had been met.

We have discussed some basic aspects of Soviet strategy for a general war. The Soviet strategic concept is predicated on the fundamental principle that war, as an instrument of policy, may assume various forms. Limitations on theaters of conflict, or on use of nuclear or other weapons, are considered as questions involving calculated advantage, and calculated maneuver to establish the conditions which would induce the opponent in his own self-interest to accept the limitations.

The Soviets tend in their published writings to discount or deny the possibility of local and limited wars, particularly limited nuclear war. But there are good reasons leading us

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to doubt that such statements represent the real Soviet view or foreshadow future Soviet behavior. They want to deter the United States from initiating such wars, from preparing defensively for them, and from bracing our diplomatic stand by consideration of them as a recourse. In seeking to maneuver the West into positions of choice between massive but mutual retaliation, or no effective response at all, the Soviets seek to deprive us of confidence that we have alternatives, including limited nuclear reaction. But actual future Soviet initiative or response will be based on calculations of risk and gain. Overt limited wars, especially with use of nuclear weapons, will probably not appear attractive to the Soviet leaders. But more generally, limited engagements, for limited objectives, and at limited risk represent the classic forms of Communist aggrandizement.

Let us now turn to brief but important reflection on the forces and capabilities envisaged and created in support of the Soviet strategy. We need not now review in detail

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the inventory of Soviet military power, particularly as you will receive a lecture on Soviet capabilities tomorrow. The general facts are: an emerging ICBM capability; a larger MRBM force; a very large ground army; still substantial air forces; and a largely defensive navy now receiving short-range missile-launching surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines.

Khrushchev announced in January 1960 a program to reduce the manpower of the Soviet armed forces by one-third and to alter the structure of the military forces. The Soviet leaders evidently judged that even with this cutback they still would have an adequate military force to meet the requirements for the coming years: growing nuclear-missile deterrent and "counterdeterrent" to the US strategic delivery capability, a strong home air defense force, a submarine missile and defensive ocean-attack navy, and a powerful ground force capable of providing superiority in any limited wars, and able both to move at once and simultaneously to form the core for large-scale mobilization in case of extended general war.

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Khrushchev's January 1960 speech represented a major decision by the Soviet Party and government on military policy. Even on the very doctrinal grounds advanced by his military advisers, at least some of whom opposed the program, Khrushchev was evidently able to insist that the ground forces, tactical and naval air forces, and surface fleet could be pared sharply without adversely shifting the general balance vis-a-vis comparable Western forces. However, it would be an oversimplification to conclude that the Soviets adopted a "New Look" policy. Missiles are increasingly being substituted for weapons systems which they can replace -- manned bombers, fighters, large surface warships, and some categories of artillery. Missiles do not replace components which perform a different and complementary function which is still considered essential in war: seizure and holding of territories. Soviet local superiorities in the areas of possible limited wars would not be affected. The dual adjustment to new weapons potentialities and to the political situation Khrushchev foresaw

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promised to permit savings in manpower, goods, and money -- and political-propaganda dividends as well -- and the addition of these valuable resources to important economic and political programs.

During the past six months, there has been a spiral of military moves and countermoves by the US and the USSR in connection with the confrontation over Berlin. In July the Soviets suspended for the time being further implementation of the 1960 program of reductions, after about one-half of the scheduled cuts had been made. Following further US increases in active forces, the Soviets later announced (in August) the temporary retention on active duty of an undisclosed number of men due for routine discharge. By now the size of the Soviet armed forces may again approximate the number two years ago. Future developments -- in the Soviet forces and in our own as well - will depend largely on the further development of the Berlin crisis. But the Soviets have continued to stress that the recent buildup of this standing army is temporary. Should international tensions subside, the Soviet armed forces will in fact probably be cut back more or less along the lines of the 1960 program.

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The main point of interest to our present inquiry is the highly significant fact that throughout these changes the nature, size, composition, organization and deployment of the armed forces of the USSR all reflect very clearly the basically unaltered Soviet strategic concept and doctrine. The Soviet view of extended campaigns even in general war, in addition to being reflected in military doctrinal writings, continues to be supported by the corresponding capabilities. For example, the Soviet Army at present maintains at varying strength about 150 line divisions, of which about 100 are combat ready. In defining and building the military capabilities to implement their strategic concept, the Soviets have been guided not by replacement of the capacities for conventional warfare, but by the addition to them of capacities for either general or limited nuclear war.

I have, so far, found it necessary only once to draw a distinction between the views of the Soviet political leaders and the military chiefs. But it may be useful to

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note that the Soviet military leaders are, naturally, more concerned with the concepts -- and requirements -- for fighting a general nuclear war should one occur, than are the political leaders who have concluded such a war need not and should not occur, and who are therefore inclined to stress other things. Significant elements in the High Command opposed the 1960 program of reductions. Khrushchev even felt it necessary to declare in no uncertain terms, after the U-2 incident in May, 1960, that the full reductions would be made as planned. And Malinovsky, at the recent Party Congress, felt obliged to justify the 1960 reductions and to stress that current buildup is temporary. But, as I have suggested, Khrushchev apparently did not argue for a refutation of the military's strategic views, but only for a readjustment which could be argued for even on the terms of the image of a future war held in current Soviet military doctrine. The mid-1961 reversal of course on military reduction was clearly favored by the military, but was decided upon by the political leaders, primarily as a political demonstration.

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I have dealt so extensively with the Soviet military strategic concept for three reasons: first, to describe the Soviet view of the wide span of military requirements which they consider necessary to meet both political needs and various possible war situation; second, to note the Soviet strategic concept which deals with the contingency of general war if such should -- despite Soviet preferences -- eventuate in the foreseeable future; and finally, as background to a consideration of alternative concepts.

On the whole, I have so far not discussed alternative strategic concepts because Soviet strategy has shown marked continuity, and because the Soviets prefer to maintain a single general line which allows within itself, rather than as possible alternatives, scope for flexibility. I believe that this concept, with its avoidance of general war, will continue to be the Soviet policy over the foreseeable future. But we should examine a drastically different alternative which might conceivably be adopted by the Soviets: the building up of maximum capability for a powerful surprise attack to destroy the US, and thus once and for all dispose of the capitalist system.

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A decision to embark on a policy of building up ICBMs and other forces for a powerful surprise attack could, I believe, be made by the Soviet leaders only if they concluded that there were an overwhelming and assurred probability of destroying our retaliatory military power without suffering unacceptable losses. The tricky points are, of course, to determine what is an "overwhelming probability," and what are "acceptable losses."

In evaluating the possibility that the Soviet leaders might conclude that a probability was overwhelming, we must not use our <u>own</u> defense assumptions. It is prudent and proper for the defense planner to guard against the enemy's maximum gross capability. Doubts, and there are inevitably many (in terms of proficiency, timing, probable aborts, and the like, as well as less than complete certainty about the enemy force) must be resolved in the attacker's favor in order to meet the worst <u>possible</u> enemy threat. But the attacker, if he is calculating the probability of destroying virtually all of the retaliatory strike capability of a powerful adversary,

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must resolve the doubts in the favor of the defense. Of course, the Soviets must be presumed to have good knowledge of our Order of Battle, though they can never be sure they know about it all. In short, in calculating probability of success in a sudden massive assault, the Soviets would probably be impressed by our full retaliatory capability plus a safety margin. In addition, there are inevitably a host of operational uncertainties, which cumulatively add up to major inhibitions. These deterrents to reaching a strike decision are heavily reinforced by the Soviet proclivity not to consider surprise, even if achieved, as ensuring a decisive final outcome if other factors are at all in doubt. Finally, as we noted earlier, there is an ideological tendency not to gamble everything on a probability calculation which could be entirely upset by any one of so many incalculables.

The problem of achieving a probability of near-complete destruction of Western retaliatory capabilities is greatly complicated by the variety of such forces and by their widely dispersed deployment. Not only do ICBMs and IRBMs,

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including Polaris IRBM-firing submarines, increasingly supplement SAC's bombers and the naval carrier task forces, but even the major part of our tactical fighters and light bombers located in numerous bases in Western Europe and elsewhere in the Eurasian periphery have the capability of one-way missions delivering nuclear weapons on almost all areas of the Soviet Union itself. In total, these number in the tens of thousands.

It is now clear that, if the Soviets ever considered seriously a crash effort to get a sufficient strike capability to destroy our strategic retaliatory forces, they rejected the enterprise. Bluntly, the Soviets have missed the boat on "the missile gap," if indeed they ever planned the trip. They did not try to build a preemptive first-strike capability in the period when they theoretically might have been able to do so. This option is no longer open, for the US is already beginning to acquire a substantial relatively invulnerable retaliatory capability, with hardened ICBM sites and the Polaris missile system.

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But let us suppose that the Soviets greatly expand both strategic missile and anti-missile capabilities in the years ahead. Could the predictable consequences of a Soviet first strike be within the bounds of "acceptable losses" to Moscow? Those who incline to the affirmative argue that the Communists are ruthless and would sacrifice 100 million Soviet citizens if need be to attain world domination. The Soviet leaders, indeed, demonstrate a standard of behavior in which humanitarianism is low. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that they would consider such losses as acceptable, for a number of reasons. The consequences for the social and political fabric of Soviet society -- and hence the consequences for their own regime and for themselves -- would be both ominous and incalculable. Another reason is that the USSR would be weakened, relative to all other countries than the US and such of our allies as also had been devastated. China, India, Sweden, Australia, Argentina would be the new great powers of the world and, after all, the Soviet aim is not

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simply to destroy us at any cost, but rather for themselves to prevail. Third, there are the genuine expectations of gradual victory of communism -- fully as pertinent as Bolshevik ruthlessness, and as ideologically powerful. And finally, the task a first-strike strategy must solve in order to be an attractive option is not only assurance of a high probability of success, but virtual elimination of the possibility of disaster. And this consideration affects not only a first-strike decision, but also a decision to build toward an ephemeral first-strike force.

Thus a Soviet decision to plan a build-up for a deliberate initiation of general war is highly unlikely because (a) the prospect of achieving adequate capabilities to insure acceptable losses is very unpromising, (b) they are advancing their power in the world by other means (and they believe that even if there are setbacks their cause is foreordained to win ultimate victory), and (c) apart from the above technical-military and ideological considerations, self-preservation is simply accorded a higher priority in Soviet policy than expansion of Communist control, so that the calculated military risks and ideological stimuli are in fact governed by political realism.

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For all these reasons, some of which I discussed earlier, this alternative probably has never even ranked as an active candidate for Soviet choice -- although we cannot, of course, ever exclude it as inconceivable.

Is this the only alternative Soviet strategic concept to the one we now see? Is there another, perhaps more favorable to the prospects for peace and gradual accommodation?

The idea of "minimum deterrence," if by that we mean something which reduces the national objective to deterrence, can be discounted as a possible Soviet policy. Not only would a military capability limited to the minimum for deterrence fail to provide the variety of military capabilities necessary to a forceful and broad-gauged foreign policy -- which alone would be enough to lead the Soviets to reject it -- but it also would prove bankrupt in the event of general war. Deterrence cannot be absolutely guaranteed to be an absolute guarantee. If the Soviets were to settle permanently for a minimum deterrent force,

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let us say a relatively few ICBMs, then if faced with general war they would not only fail to have acceptable losses in prospect, but they would indeed virtually be assured of unacceptable losses. Just as one does not invest all his income in savings and life insurance, so he does not -- if he is prudent -- invest the minimum to pay for his funeral.

Nonetheless, minimum deterrence -- which at least allows prospects for gains through continuing political warfare -- must be ranked ahead of the one-chance build-up for the all-on-a-chance strike. However, I have really raised a "straw man" in minimum deterrence. The Soviet military and political leaders will probably weigh capabilities beyond a deterrent to Western attack in terms of declining marginal increments to support of their policy of pressure, balanced against the expense to other political and economic programs which they consider will contribute to shaping the course of history. Consequently, they will probably not procure the maximum technically attainable missile and anti-missile forces, but will build a force for deterrence and aggressive counterdeterrence, plus some hedging against the possibility of general war.

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I would like to emphasize that although I have dealt at some length with Soviet concepts for preparation and possible use of military power in war, the uses of military power without their commitment to battle are perhaps more important, and at least more immediate. By concentrating their diplomatic pressures at points where we are militarily weak relative to forces under their control, and in ways that tend to neutralize or bypass our strategic deterrent, the Soviets doubtless hope to find occasion to make gradual gains. This is the calculation behind their push on Berlin. They also probably hope in other cases to be able to place the West in the position of having to face an unhappy choice between the disadvantages either of using military force to oppose "internal" subversive activities as in Vietnam or to intervene in "civil war" as in Laos or the Congo, or of losing such places. Not always would they expect to win, but even occasional victories contribute to continuing and cumulative gains.

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The Soviets have recently distinguished "categories" of wars, in a way which reflects their own intentions and expectations. In brief, they recognize the enormous destructiveness and undesirability of general war, and also the risk of such war in direct East-West confrontation in limited wars. At the same time, they want to support and to further anti-Western revolutions and "wars of national liberation," and they attempt to justify support to pro-Western forces. They seek to present the matter as a clearcut question of anti-colonialists vs colonialists, though this often does not correspond to the real situation. In Laos or the Congo, for example, with a confused legal and popular situation, probably basically favoring non-Communist parties, the Soviets apply a double-standard under which they can support the factions they control or consider more amenable to their influence supposedly while the opposing factions cannot be supported by similar Western aid, which they term "intervention." Khrushchev restated the Soviet public position at the Twenty-Second Party Congress by declaring that: "Communists are against the

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export of revolution ... but we do not recognize anyone's right to export counterrevolution." It seems clear both from communist practice and from recent Soviet statements that they see the arena of open military conflict in the period ahead as one involving primarily non-Bloc forces, with the Communists supporting communist and other anti-Western factions indirectly by military aid and by exerting pressure to prevent or weaken Western support to pro-Western or neutral opposition. I have not gone into communist subversive activities in a lecture on Soviet military strategy, but this dimension of over-all strategy is obviously very important.

In summary, Soviet military strategy is designed: (1) to defend and maintain the Soviet power; (2) to provide available and sufficient capabilities should general war become necessary; (3) to provide available and sufficient capabilities should localized use be expedient; and finally, (4) to support a forceful, active, and flexible foreign policy in peacetime as well as in war.

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